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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
In recent past, Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) has become more 
popular because of its flexibility. However, WLANs are subjected to different types 
of vulnerabilities. To strengthen WLAN security, many high security protocols have 
been developed. But those solutions are found to be ineffective in preventing Denial 
of Service (DoS) attacks. A ‘Connection Request Flooding’ DoS (CRF-DoS) attack is 
launched when an access point (AP) encounters a sudden explosion of connection 
requests. Among other existing anti CRF-DoS methods, a client puzzle protocol has 
been noted as a promising and secure potential solution. Nonetheless, so far none of 
the proposed puzzles satisfy the security requirement of resource-limited and highly 
heterogeneous WLANs. The CPU disparity, imposing unbearable loads on legitimate 
users, inefficient puzzle generation and verification algorithms; the susceptibility of 
puzzle to secondary attacks on legitimate users by embedding fake puzzle parameters; 
and a notable delay in modifying the puzzle difficulty – these are some drawbacks of 
currently existing puzzles. To deal with such problems, a secure model of puzzle based 
on DNA and queuing theory is proposed, which eliminates the above defects while 
satisfying the Chen puzzle security model. The proposed puzzle (OROD puzzle) is a 
multifaceted technology that incorporates five main components include DoS detector, 
queue manager, puzzle generation, puzzle verification, and puzzle solver. To test and 
evaluate the security and performance, OROD puzzle is developed and implemented 
in real-world environment. The experimental results showed that the solution 
verification time of OROD puzzle is up to 289, 160, 9, 3.2, and 2.3 times faster than 
the Karame-Capkun puzzle, the Rivest time-lock puzzle, the Rangasamy puzzle, the 
Kuppusamy DLPuz puzzle, and Chen's efficient hash-based puzzle respectively. The 
results also showed a substantial reduction in puzzle generation time, making the 
OROD puzzle from 3.7 to 24 times faster than the above puzzles. Moreover, by asking 
to solve an easy and cost-effective puzzle in OROD puzzle, legitimate users do not 
suffer from resource exhaustion during puzzle solving, even when under severe DoS 
attack (high puzzle difficulty).  
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
 
Pada masa lalu Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) menjadi semakin 
popular kerana fleksibilitinya. Walau bagaimanapun, WLAN adalah tertakluk kepada 
beberapa jenis kelemahan. Untuk mengukuhkan keselamatan WLAN, banyak protokol 
keselamatan yang tinggi telah dibangunkan. Tetapi penyelesaian ini didapati tidak 
berkesan dalam mencegah serangan Denial of Service (DoS). Satu serangan 
permintaan banjir DoS (CRF DoS) dilancarkan apabila pusat akses (AP) menghadapi 
permintaan sambungan yang tinggi secara tiba-tiba. Antara kaedah anti-CRF-DoS lain 
yang sedia ada protokol puzzle pelanggan yang telah diambil sebagai penyelesaian 
yang baik dan boleh dipercayai. Walau bagaimanapun, setakat ini tidak ada satu 
jangkaan yang dicadangkan pun memenuhi syarat-syarat keselamatan sumber yang 
terhad dan WLAN yang heterogen. CPU perbezaan beban yg tidak berdasarkan pada 
pengguna yang sah, generasi teka-teki yang tidak cekap dan algoritma pengesahan 
untuk pengenalan; kelemahan teka-teki untuk serangan kedua pada pengguna yang 
palsu; mengubah dan kelewatan yang luar biasa dalam kesukaran teka-teki - ini adalah 
beberapa kelemahan teka-teki kini yang sedia ada. Untuk menguruskan masalah ini, 
satu model teka-teki yang selamat berdasarkan DNA dan teori teratur telah 
dicadangkan yang pasti menghapuskan kelemahan di atas dengan melengkapkan 
model keselamatan teka-teki. Teka-teki yang dicadangkan (Teka-teki OROD) adalah 
teknologi yang kompleks, yang menggabungkan lima komponen utama termasuk 
pengesanan DoS, pengurus barisan, generasi teka-teki, teka-teki termasuk pengesahan 
dan teka-teki penyelesaian. Untuk menguji dan menilai keselamatan dan prestasi, 
OROD Puzzle dibangunkan dan dilaksanakan dalam persekitaran dunia sebenar. 
Keputusan eksperimen menunjukkan bahawa masa pengesahan penyelesaian Teka-
teki OROD adalah sebanyak 289, 160, 9, 3.2, dan 2.3 kali lebih cepat daripada teka-
teki karamel Capkun, masa-kunci teka-teki Rivest teka-teki Rangasamy teka-teki 
Kuppusamy DLPuz dan  teka-teki cekap berdasarkan hash Chen. Keputusan juga 
menunjukkan pengurangan yang ketara daripada masa generasi teka-teki, menjadikan 
OROD teka-teki 3,7-24 kali lebih cepat daripada teka-teki di atas. Selain itu, dengan 
menyelesaikan teka-teki yang mudah dan kos efektif dalam teki OROD, pengguna 
yang sah tidak mengalami kekurangan sumber semasa menyelesaikan teka-teki 
walaupun di bawah serangan DoS (Teka-teki kesukaran tinggi).  
vii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER                                      TITLE                                                        PAGE 
 
DECLARATION         ii 
DEDICATION        iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT       iv 
ABSTRACT          v 
ABSTRAK         vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS                 vii 
LIST OF TABLES                   xi 
LIST OF FIGURES                  xii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS               xiv 
 
1  INTRODUCTION       1 
1.1 802.11 Based Network Authentication   1 
1.2 Wireless Threats      2 
1.3 Background of the Problem     7 
1.4 Problem Statement      9 
1.4.1 Research Question     11 
1.5 Research Aim       12 
1.6 Research Objectives      12 
1.7 Significance of the Study     13 
1.8 Research Scope      13 
1.9 Outline of the Thesis      15 
 
   2  LITERATURE REVIEW      17 
2.1 Computer Network      17 
 2.1.1 Transmission Medium    19 
 2.1.2 Network Scale     20 
viii 
 
 2.1.3 Network Standards     21 
  2.1.3.1 IEEE Standard 802.11   22 
2.2 New Trend in Computer Networks    24 
2.3 WLAN Operational Mode     25 
2.4 WLAN Architecture      26 
2.4.1 Independent BSS     26 
2.4.2 Infrastructure BSS     27 
2.4.3 Extended service set     28 
2.4.4 Hybrid Networks     29 
2.5 WLAN Services      30 
2.6 WLAN Management Operation    32 
2.6.1 Scanning      32 
2.6.2 Authentication     32 
 2.6.2.1 Open System Authentication   33 
2.6.4 Association      34 
2.7 WLAN Connection Procedure    34 
2.7.1 Connection State and Class    37 
2.8 Attack on WLAN      39 
2.8.1 Identity Spoofing Attack    39 
2.8.2 Eavesdropping Attack     40 
2.8.3 Vulnerability Attack     40 
2.8.4 Replay Attack      40 
2.8.5 Rogue Access Point Attack    40 
2.8.6 Denial of Service Attack    41 
2.8.6.1 Connection Request Flooding Attack 43 
2.8.6.2 Distributed Denial of Service Attack 44 
2.9 Anti-DoS Flooding Methods     46 
2.9.1 Client Puzzles      47 
2.9.2 Puzzle Construction     48 
2.9.3 Puzzle Properties     49 
2.10 Protein Synthesizing      54 
2.11 Related Works      57 
2.11.1 Hash-Based Puzzles      58 
2.11.2 Number Theoretic Puzzles    62 
ix 
 
2.11.3 Other Payment Schemes    65 
  2.12 Puzzle Challenges      75 
2.13 Summary       78 
 
3  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY     79 
  3.1 Assumption       80 
3.2 Inception Phase of Proposed Puzzle    81 
3.3 Design and Development Phase    83 
3.3.1 Designing the Proposed Client Puzzle Protocol 84 
3.3.2 Puzzle Development and Implementation  86 
 3.3.2.1 Idea behind the Proposed Puzzle  87 
3.3.3 Puzzle Generation     89 
3.3.4 Puzzle Solving     89 
3.3.5 Puzzle Verification     90 
3.3.6 Threshold Effect     90 
3.3.7 Testing the Developed Puzzle   93 
3.4 Security Evaluation Phase     93 
3.4.1 Empirical Study     94 
3.4.2 Analytical Study     95 
3.4.3 Security Properties     95 
3.5 Implementation Tools      96 
3.6 Deliverables Table      97 
3.7 Summary       98 
 
4  DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION    99 
  4.1 OROD Puzzle Protocol              100 
4.2 Puzzle Generation Phase              101 
4.2.1 DoS Detector Module              101 
4.2.2 Queue Manager Module             102 
4.2.3 Puzzle Generator Module             102 
4.3 Puzzle Solving Phase               106 
4.3.1 tRNA Extractor Module             107 
4.3.2 Unique Key Constructor Module            107 
4.3.2 Category Number Finder Module            108 
x 
 
4.4 Puzzle Verification Phase              109 
4.5 Generation Cost               111 
4.6 Solving Cost                112 
4.7 Verification Cost               115 
4.8 Queue Manager Thresholds              117 
4.9 Access Latency               124 
4.10 Summary                126 
 
5  RESULT AND DISCUSSION              128 
  5.1 OROD Puzzle Motivation              129 
5.2 OROD Puzzle Generation Analysis             130 
5.3 OROD Puzzle Solving Analysis             131 
5.4 OROD Puzzle Verification Analysis             133 
5.5 Performance Evaluation              134 
5.6 Security Analysis               136 
5.6.1 Formal Definition of OROD Puzzle            139 
5.6.2 Puzzle Unforgeability              141 
5.6.3 Puzzle Difficulty              143 
5.7 Compare to Other Works              149 
5.7.1 Efficiency               149 
5.7.2 Immunity               150 
5.7.3 Fairness               151 
5.7.4 Other Properties              151 
5.8 Summary                154 
 
6  CONCLUSION                155 
  6.1 Research Summary and Conclusion             156 
6.2 Contribution of the Study              159 
6.6 Future Work                161 
 
REFERENCES                  163 
 
 
  
xi 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
 
TABLE NO.     TITLE                     PAGE 
2.1   Classified interconnected processors by scale   20 
2.2  A summary of existing client puzzles    76 
3.1  Deliverables Table       97 
4.1  Generation cost on AP               111 
4.2  Solving cost on STAs                113 
4.3  Finding valid-looking MAC Addresses             114 
4.4  Verification cost                115 
4.5  Computation power of AP for OROD puzzle verification           117 
5.1  Solving cost on legitimate STA and attacker             132 
5.2  Performance comparison               135 
5.3  Efficiency Comparison               150 
5.4  A comparison based on puzzle properties             153 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
xii 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE NO.    TITLE           PAGE 
1.1 Different targets on which to launch DoS attacks in WLAN 
deployment           6 
1.2 The Narrow-down View of the Research Scope    14 
2.1  Literature review Structure                  18 
2.2  Network Example                   19 
2.3  The IEEE 802 family                   21 
2.4  Components of 802.11 LANs                  23 
2.5  (a) Wireless network with an AP. (b) Ad hoc network              24 
2.6  Independent BSS or IBSS                  26 
2.7  Infrastructure BSS                   27 
2.8  Extended service set or ESS                  29 
2.9  Distribution system or backbone                 29 
2.10  Hybrid networks                   30 
2.11  Open-system authentication exchange                34 
2.12  802.11 authentication and association procedure               35 
2.13  Association procedure                  36 
2.14  Relationship between state variables and services               38 
2.15  Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)                45 
2.16  Interactive client puzzle protocol                 49 
2.17  Protein synthesis translation process      55 
2.18  Elongation (Translation) process continues     56 
2.19  Protein synthesis termination process     57 
2.20 Client puzzle protocol in association procedure based on 
 extracting square roots       60 
2.21  Subset sum puzzle                   66 
2.22  Solving a sliding tile problem                  68 
xiii 
 
2.23  Guided Tour puzzle                   71 
3.1  OROD Puzzle satisfies WLAN Puzzle properties    82 
3.2  Development phase        83 
3.3  How to obtain puzzle parameters for different attack level   86 
3.4  An abstract Demonstration of Proposed Client Puzzle   88 
3.5  A flowchart of thresholds determination     92 
3.6  Network deployment to study proposed technique    94 
4.1  OROD puzzle protocol                100 
4.2  OROD puzzle solving process               106 
4.3  Beacon frame                  107 
4.4  OROD Puzzle Verification Process               110 
4.5  Generation cost on AP                111 
4.6  Solving cost on STA                 113 
4.7 A logarithmic scale of finding valid-looking MAC  
address (6-bit AA)                 114 
4.8  Authentication frame                 116 
4.9  OROD Client Puzzle Protocol               119 
4.10 Revenue of the attacker in a high-load attack  
with OROD Client Puzzle Protocol               122 
4.11 Revenue of the attacker in a Medium-load attack with  
OROD Client Puzzle Protocol               123 
4.12 Revenue of the attacker in a low-load attack 
 with OROD Client Puzzle Protocol               123 
4.13  Available AID during attack without OROD puzzle             124 
4.14 Latency for a legitimate STA in the absence of OROD puzzle 
 during attack                  125 
4.15  Available AID during attack with OROD puzzle             125 
4.16 Latency for a legitimate STA in the presence of OROD puzzle 
 during attack                  126 
5.1  Solving cost on legitimate STA and attacker              132 
 
 
 
 
  
xiv 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
 
 
AID - Association ID 
AP - Access Point 
ARP - Address Resource Protocol 
BSA - Basic Service Area 
BSS - Basic Service Set 
CPP - Client Puzzle Protocol 
CPU - Circuit Processing Unit 
CSMA/CA - Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance  
DLS - Direct Link Setup 
DNA - Deoxyribonucleic acid 
DoS Attack - Denial of Service Attack 
DSS - Distribution System Service 
ESS - Extended Service Set 
FH - frequency-hopping 
GAN - Global Area Network 
HDP - Hide difficulty Puzzle 
HDX - Half Duplex 
IBSS - Independent Basic Service Set 
IEEE - Institute Electrical and  Electronics  Engineer 
IRS - Internal Revenue Service 
ISM - Industrial, Scientific, Medical 
xv 
 
ITU-R - 
International Telecommunication Union-Radio 
communication sector 
K/M/Gbps - Kilo/Mega/Giga bit per second 
LAN - Local Area Network 
LLC - Logical Link Control 
MAC - Media Access Control 
MAN - Metropolitan Area Network 
MANET - Mobile Ad-hoc Network 
MD5 - Message Digest 
MSDU - MAC Service Data Unit 
NIC  - Network Interface Card 
NS2 - Network Simulator version 2 
NST - Neighborhood Signal Threshold  
OFDM - orthogonal frequency division multiplexing 
OSI - Open System Interconnection 
OTCL - Object-Oriented Tool Command Language 
PAN - Personal Area Network 
PC - Personal Computer 
PCS -  Personal Communications Service 
PDA - Personal Digital Assistant 
PHY - Physical Layer Specification 
POW - proof-of-work system 
PSK - Pre-Shared Key 
QoS - Quality of Service 
RF - Radio Frequency 
RSNA - Robust Security Network Association 
SAE - Simultaneous Authentication of Equals 
SDR - software-deﬁned radio  
xvi 
 
SS - Station Service 
SSID - Service Set Identifier 
STA - Wireless-capable Station 
TCP/IP - Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
UAV - autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle 
USB - Universal Serial Bus 
VANET - Vehicular Ad-hoc Network 
WAN  - Wide Area Network 
WiMAX - Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
WLAN - Wireless LAN 
   
 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 802.11 based Network Authentication  
 
 
IEEE standard 802.11 defines two classes of security algorithms for 802.11 
based networks (IEEE LAN/MAN Standards Committee, 2012):  
 
 
i. Robust security network association or RSNA algorithm 
 
ii. Pre-RSNA algorithm 
 
 
This standard defines a number of authentication algorithms under both 
security classes. Open system and shared key authentication algorithms are classified 
under the pre-RSNA algorithm class, while the RSNA security class introduces 802.1x 
and SAE (simultaneous authentication of equals) as its authentication algorithms.  
 
 
It should be stressed that an open system authentication is a null authentication 
algorithm. In other words, any STA requesting open system authentication may be 
authenticated if the recipient STA (e.g. AP) operates in open system authentication 
mode. Open System authentication is the default authentication algorithm for pre-
RSNA equipment. 
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1.2 Wireless Threats 
 
 
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless access, however, the future of WLAN, 
as they get more popular, presents challenges (Tupakul et al., 2011; Gherghina and 
Petrică, 2013) that can only be met by a reliable and secure wireless communication 
system (Arockiam et al., 2012).  
 
 
In order to simplify the attachment of STAs to a wireless network, the 
connection procedure in wireless networks has been designed without providing an 
authentication mechanism on MAC frame header fields (Soryal and Saadawi, 2014) 
particularly in open authentication mode. This security hole makes forging the source 
address of an MAC frame so easy that identifying the source of traffic is virtually 
impossible. The following critical evaluations have been made: 
 
 
i. While a number of security enhancements to the standard 802.11 have already 
been proposed and implemented to protect WLANs, a key challenge for 
defense is how to discriminate legitimate requests for service from malicious 
access attempts. 
 
ii. In the public area, there is no mechanism to check the authorization of a source 
wishing to gain access to a service. Thus, to deliver MAC frames to their 
destination, only the AP - at the heart of the network - can decide whether or 
not these requests are accepted and served. 
 
iii. The pervasiveness of wireless communication demands sophisticated resource 
sharing mechanisms - which unfortunately become security loopholes in the 
whole system. 
 
iv. Sending bogus connection requests is much cheaper than validating those 
requests. When the authentication server is not protecting limited-resource AP 
against false requests (whose aim is to exhaust available resources), the 
solution becomes more challenging.  
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Even though a series of security extensions to the standard 802.11 have already 
been proposed and implemented to protect WLANs, most of them are primarily 
effective against attacks seeking to create unauthorized APs, or to breach 
confidentiality. As we depend ever more on wireless access, the issue of availability 
must be also considered, thus becoming another important security requirement 
(Bicakci and Tavli, 2009; Singh and Sharma, 2015). 
 
 
As in all information technologies, the three core security objectives for 
wireless networks are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The first two are 
easier to resolve than the third.  The confidentiality objective is mostly encountered 
through passive attacks, which are carried out by eavesdropping. Confidentiality can 
be solved by data encryption. Integrity is threatened by active attacks, while the 
availability is usually placed in the arena of active attacks (Jing and Wen, 2011). 
 
 
The necessary availability of wireless networks means that it is vulnerable to 
denial of service (DoS) attacks (Eian and Mjølsnes, 2011). A DoS attack intends to 
deny legitimate users access to shared services or resources (Rangasamy et al., 2011). 
Because wireless networks rely on broadcasting signals, launching DoS attacks 
remains straightforward. Furthermore, there are numerous DoS vulnerabilities to the 
standard 802.11 – as demonstrated through experiments noted in the literature. 
 
 
Note that the effort required by an attacker is relatively limited, while the 
wireless networks quickly exhausts its resources by allocating them to the unﬁnished 
access attempts (Malik and Singh, 2015). Moreover, not only do DoS attacks on 
wireless systems cripple the communication infrastructure of an organization, they can 
also be the ﬁrst phase of more sophisticated attacks (Thapa, 2012). After making a 
wireless network disappear, a forged system belonging to the attacker can pose as the 
main system and launch a ‘man-in-the-middle attack’. An attacker mounting a DoS 
attack on a wireless network used in safety critical applications could cause injury or 
death, as well as significant material damage. 
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Guarding against DoS attacks should be a critical component of a security 
system in the current modern day era (Jerschow and Mauve, 2013). Threats like virus, 
worm, and malware are old school when compared to DoS attacks because DoS attacks 
in wireless data networks have a potential to undermine the advantages that come with 
wireless networks. A WLAN AP, in general, has limited capacity and limited resources 
like processing power and memory. Hence, an AP can easily fall prey to DoS attacks 
as its queue can be easily choked and flooded by attack packets (Sharma and Barwal, 
2014). The aftermath of DoS attacks range from crippling the network performance to 
completely bringing it down. So for an organization that has critical operations like 
point of sales, security cameras over wireless network, surveillance systems and so on, 
any hiccups in the network can cause severe impact on their business (Hangargi, 2015; 
Ragupathy and Sharma, 2014). Easy availability of DoS attack tools and mechanisms 
deteriorates the situation (Singh and Sharma, 2015). For traditional wired networks 
DoS have been extensively studied but there has been a lack of research study to 
prevent such attacks on wireless data networks (Singh and Sharma, 2014). 
 
 
Similarly with wired networks, DoS attacks are very commonplace in wireless 
networks (Mendyk-Krajewska et al., 2012; Jing and Wen, 2011) and no security 
mechanisms or standards to date can resist them (Fragkiadakis et al., 2014; Sharma 
and Barwal, 2014; Singh and Sharma, 2015). In order to demonstrate the potential 
severity of the problem, an overview will be conducted of the literature pertaining to 
DoS attacks on 802.11 standard wireless networks. 
 
 
It is well-known that in the case of wireless LANs, Wi-Fi sniffer tools make it 
an easy task for attackers to learn authorized MAC addresses. Other available tools 
help him to change his MAC address accordingly. Thus authenticating STAs via their 
MAC is not a secure process. 
 
 
Moreover, the association protocol, designed as a stateful procedure, is 
susceptible to a depletion attack on the AP’s resources. The idea which underlies this 
is to transmit a flurry of connection requests (probe requests, authentication requests, 
and association requests (Sharma and Barwal, 2014)) identified by MAC addresses of 
spoofed sources – thus forcing a heavy workload onto an AP. 
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Among WLAN security protocols, WEP and WPA have no consideration for 
DoS attacks. IEEE 802.11i does not give enough priority to AP security because of 
computational limitations and for accommodating a large number of existing 
authentication methods (Gherghina and Petrică, 2014). During initial entity 
authentication, the STA is authenticated to authentication server (AS) only, but not to 
the AP. Because of this, attacks like DoS pose a threat and deprive services to 
legitimate users (Singh and Sharma, 2015).  
 
 
MAC layer DoS attacks are perpetrated by spoofing messages exchanged 
between a client and Access Point. There are vulnerabilities in the protocols at the 
MAC layer (Sharma and Barwal, 2014). Although protection for data frames is 
addressed through encryption, there is lack of protection methodologies implemented 
for control and management frames (Arockiam et al., 2012). 802.11 management 
frames like authentication/association and deauthentication/disassociation remained 
unprotected and unauthenticated; that is, they are neither authenticated nor encrypted. 
Also the first message of the four-way handshake proposed by standard 802.11i is not 
protected; it can be utilized in DoS attacks for blocking the protocol (Singh and 
Sharma, 2013). This means that these unauthenticated STA frames can be used to 
cause a DoS attack. In fact, there is no cryptographic mechanism to determine if a 
frame is sent by a genuine client or AP (Tupakul et al., 2011). IEEE 802.11w (2009) 
is developed as a solution against DoS conducted using management frames, but it is 
not useful against connection request flooding DoS attacks (Ahmad and Tadakamadla, 
2011; Eian and Mjolsnes, 2012). Thus, no security protocol protects effectively against 
connection request flooding DoS attacks while various control frames and 
management frames are subject to manipulation by an intruder making it feasible for 
him to carry out connection request flooding DoS attacks. 
 
 
At the 802.11 layer, shared-key authentication by WEP (wired equivalent 
privacy) is flawed and rarely used. The other alternative is the open system 
authentication (null authentication), which relies on higher-level authentication such 
as 802.1x or VPN. Open system authentication allows any client to be authenticated 
and then associated. An attacker, can take advantage of such vulnerability, and exhaust 
an AP’s resources (most importantly the client association table) by emulating a large 
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number of wireless STAs with spoofed MAC addresses. Each one of these emulated 
STAs attempts association and authentication with the target AP, but exits the protocol 
transaction before completion. When the AP's client association table is filled up with 
these emulated STAs and their incomplete authentication states, legitimate STAs can 
no longer be serviced by the attacked AP – the DoS attack has succeeded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1   Different targets on which to launch DoS attacks in WLAN deployment 
 
 
Authentication methods such as Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi 
Protected Access (WPA) and Wi-Fi-Protected Access 2 (WPA2) are standards used to 
authenticate users so that only authorized clients can access the network. Being 
computationally intensive process, however, there is evidence that shows when an AP 
accepts such authentication methods as the security protocol, it must deal with more 
of a load, thus can be overloaded with comparatively less traffic (Singh and Sharma, 
2014; Singh and Sharma, 2015; Jerschow and Mauve, 2013). Moreover, frequent 
association requests are responded to by many APs when the requester is in the initial 
stages. This flaw allows the attacker to fill up the EAP packet identifier's capacity 
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(since it is only 8-bits long) by association request flooding (in situations where the 
standard 802.11i has been implemented (Arockiam et al., 2012)). 
 
 
In wireless networks, various targets are threatened by connection request 
flooding DoS attacks. As shown in Figure 1.1, the wireless infrastructure, specific 
service, and mobile devices (STAs) are all vulnerable (Ratnayake et al., 2014). 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Background of the Problem 
 
 
Even though the impact of distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) is 
provably high (Sharma and Barwal, 2014), it needs tremendously more investment to 
launch than DoS attack. Despite of spreading mobile devices, gathering numerous 
zombies in a certain place at a certain time is not possible without paying a high cost. 
Consequently, launching connection request flooding DoS attack on WLANs is much 
more likely than DDoS attack. Hence, almost all researchers have mainly focused on 
WLAN connection request flooding DoS attack (Jerschow and Mauve, 2013; Soryal 
and Saadawi, 2014; Ragupathy and Sharma, 2014; Abraham and Vincent, 2012). 
 
 
Over the past decades, a whole set of countermeasures have been proposed by 
researchers to mitigate or even eliminate the harmful effects of DoS attacks, 
particularly the connection request flooding (CRF) DoS attacks on computer networks 
(Loukas and Öke, 2010; Singh and Sharma, 2015; Arockiam et al., 2012; Soryal and 
Saadawi, 2014). However, a key challenge for DoS defense schemes is how to 
discriminate legitimate requests for service from malicious access attempts 
(Rangasamy et al., 2012). A number of countermeasures both in the physical and MAC 
layers have been discussed by researchers (Bicakci and Tavli, 2009; Singh and 
Sharma, 2015). These solutions are: cryptographic protection, security protocol repair, 
client puzzle, intrusion detection systems (IDS), decreasing the retry limit, identifying 
with signal strength info, identifying through RF fingerprint. 
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The cryptographic solution, such as authentication by WEP, is a promising way 
to treat DoS attacks by restricting connections to only authorized users. However, 
authentication itself is typically a computationally intensive process. Hence, the 
authentication protocol may become a valuable target for CRF DoS attacks as the 
attackers may force the AP to perform expensive operations by sending a large number 
of bogus connection requests (Hwanga et al., 2010). To eliminate any security hole in 
current protocols, backward compatibility is vital. However, undertaking efficient 
reparations are a serious challenge to any new standardization effort, without risking 
compatibility. IDS/IPS systems such as Cisco adaptive wireless intrusion prevention 
system (WIPS) detect DoS attacks based on attack signatures and trigger an alarm 
when bogus MAC addresses are noticed. However, these systems require a human 
interaction to react to DoS attacks. Moreover, false positive errors are significantly 
high in IDS/IPS systems (Morais and Cavalli, 2014). On top of this, attackers can 
easily bypass this system, just like a wired IDS. There are many signs that WIPS are 
vulnerable – they have become an epicenter of failure. Using RSSI (receiver signal 
strength indicator) measurements to identify spoofed MAC addresses is a practical and 
effective defense against CRF DoS attack (Faria and Cheriton, 2006). However, this 
technique is not applicable when all the STAs are served by a single AP. Moreover, 
distinguishing two devices in close physical proximity is almost impossible with an 
RSSI measurement. It is also unable to identify STAs that use multiple antennas. 
 
 
Undoubtedly, by standardizing cryptographic defenses, the overall resistance 
of WLANs against DoS attack can be improved. There is a good understanding of the 
necessity of protecting servers which employ a cryptographic protocol with a client 
puzzle: several developing Internet standards (Moskowitz et al., 2008) have already 
adopted this combination. In WLANs, where highly heterogeneous STAs are often 
hosted, these wire-adopted standards need to stand up to close scrutiny. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that client puzzle protocols need to be researched, studied and developed 
further before being incorporated into WLAN standards which rely on cryptographic 
protection. One of the most active research areas in wireless networking currently is 
puzzles (Chibiao et al., 2011; Groza and Warinschi, 2013). The goal is to find out 
whether a truly effective puzzle can be designed for wireless network security - a 
puzzle that is easy for legitimate STAs to solve with moderate resources, but difficult 
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enough to hinder attackers who might be undertaking a flooding attack. Some of the 
issues in existing client puzzles include CPU disparity, inefficiency, overloading 
legitimate STAs, forgeability, imposing attack on legitimate STAs, and impractical 
puzzle difficulty system. 
 
 
 
 
1.4 Problem Statement 
 
 
Despite promising role of client puzzle to combat DoS attack, there are several 
reasons which make client puzzle impractical in wireless environment. 
 
 
i. Basically mobile devices are categorized in low end devices where resources 
are limited. Hence, a computational-intensive process like client puzzle is not 
a desirable countermeasure.  
 
ii. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless access, exhausting the target resources 
are much easier than those in wired environment. Hence, applying puzzles 
designed for wired networks in a WLAN environment may allow an attacker 
to launch a secondary DoS attack on APs or STAs - where all three phases of 
the client puzzle protocol (puzzle generation, verification, and solving) become 
valuable targets for attackers. 
 
iii. Often wireless networks host highly heterogeneous devices. Puzzle difficulty 
changes have a big impact on wireless network quality so that no wireless 
vendors accepted client puzzle so far to combat DoS attack. 
 
Even though many puzzles have been proposed in literature, above reasons 
make those puzzles unsuitable in WLANs. Hence, there is a big need to design a 
WLAN specific puzzle with following properties to combat CRF DoS attack while 
saving resources. 
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The statement of the problem can be put as follows: 
 
 
i. Designing a secure puzzle which imposes an extra cost only on the attacker is 
yet to be achieved. Solving puzzles demands more computational and/or 
memory resources from a legitimate STA. This situation becomes worse when 
an attacker increases the attack intensity, hindering or stopping legitimate 
STAs from joining the network (Singh and Sharma, 2015).  
 
ii. Designing an efficient puzzle that eliminates the problem of CPU disparity in 
WLANs is yet to be achieved. CPU disparity is a serious issue in existing 
puzzles, particularly for implementation in wireless networks where highly 
heterogeneous devices are often hosted (Tang and Jeckmans, 2011). Even 
though some researchers have tried to remove the harmful effect of CPU 
disparity from their puzzles, they significantly increased the work overload of 
the AP (Wu et al., 2015). 
 
iii. A secondary CRF DoS attack can be launched on client puzzle protocol if the 
puzzle is not efficient enough on the AP’s side (Abraham and Vincent, 2012; 
Jerschow and Mauve, 2013). Puzzle setup, generation, and verification must 
cost as little as possible to achieve the puzzle goal. 
 
iv. A puzzle which maintains the property of uniqueness for requests while 
delegating the uniqueness of processing to the STA without any security breach 
is yet to be designed. Puzzle uniqueness is an important property to prevent 
bogus puzzle solutions (Wu et al., 2015). To achieve this, the AP has to produce 
a unique puzzle for every request, which leads to a security hole for the 
network. One solution is to delegate puzzle generation to client. However, that 
raises another issue called pre-computation attack (Jerschow and Mauve, 
2012). 
 
v. Designing a puzzle which makes puzzle solving a worthless target for 
launching a second DoS attack on benign STAs is yet to be achieved. Forging 
a connection request bearing a bogus MAC address is much easier in a wireless 
network, thereby forging puzzles with a high level of difficulty is very 
commonplace (Jerschow and Mauve, 2013; Jerschow and Mauve, 2012).  
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vi. A puzzle which is able to modify the current puzzle difficulty instantaneously 
based on the current attack status is yet to be designed. So far, for all existing 
puzzles, the modification of puzzle difficulty always suffers from a significant 
lag behind changes in attack intensity (Koh et al., 2013; Abraham and Vincent, 
2012). Consequently, the current puzzle is solved with an old and inefficient 
difficulty level, while only the new puzzle generated in the next cycle will carry 
the new difficulty level.  
 
 
 
 
1.4.1 Research Question 
 
 
The main questions which this research aims to answer are: 
 
 
i. What features should have a puzzle before it can be used in WLANs? 
 
ii. How does a puzzle exhaust only attacker’s resources while legitimate STAs 
stay safe from any resource exhaustion? 
 
iii. How does a puzzle consume the same resources in all types of devices 
while the operational environment, like WLANs, hosts a highly 
heterogeneous devices? 
 
iv. Considering resource constraint, how should a WLAN puzzle be designed 
that all STAs, but attacker, can easily solve it even under sever attack?  
 
v. Why is the puzzle uniqueness vital and how does it achieved? 
 
vi. How does the attacker make the puzzle difficulty ineffective to prevent 
DoS attack and how does the proposed puzzle stop him? 
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1.5 Research Aim 
 
 
The aim of this study is to examine and analyze a common DoS attack on 
wireless networks; namely resource depletion or connection request flooding attacks 
which are run through flooding connection requests including probe, authentication, 
and association requests on APs. Also, it aims to propose a solution based on a client 
puzzle protocol, which will protect the AP’s resources by forcing an attacker to exhaust 
their resources, while at the same time, allowing legitimate users to pass the 
association procedure with only a negligible payment. 
 
 
 
 
1.6 Research Objectives 
 
 
This research focuses mainly on connection request flooding DoS attacks on 
WLANs. Hence, the ultimate goal of this project will be to achieve the following 
objectives: 
 
 
i. To determine which properties and features a client puzzle protocol (CPP) 
should have to suit WLANs 
 
ii. To propose a WLAN puzzle to impose resource cost only on attacker while 
it takes the same time to solve for heterogeneous STAs. 
 
iii. To develop a WLAN puzzle to protect all puzzle phases against a second 
CRF DoS attack while controlling the puzzle difficulty instantaneously 
 
iv. To analyze the security of WLAN association and authentication 
procedure based on developed puzzle  
 
v. To evaluate the performance of the proposed client puzzle protocol. 
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1.7 Significance of the Study 
 
 
Secure wireless communication is not only important in the military ﬁeld, but 
has an equal signiﬁcance in civilian and commercial ﬁelds as well. Wireless 
applications monitor national landmarks and critical infrastructures, wireless networks 
administer aviation trafﬁc, and wireless communication allows for remote access of 
patients’ medical records. All of these uses of wireless communication need a 
robustness1 and security similar to that of a wireless reconnaissance mission on the 
battleﬁeld, even if the immediate importance of the latter may be greater (Thapa, 2011; 
Rangasamy et al., 2012). 
 
 
Finding and developing an efficient and effective puzzle improves and secures 
wireless communication, so users can safely connect to wireless networks whenever 
they need to get access to it (particularly the Internet). Additionally, implementing the 
proposed puzzle in a real wireless infrastructure will result in a significant increase in 
the cost of DoS attacks, so that it dissuades an attacker from launching them. 
 
 
 
 
1.8 Research Scope 
 
 
This research will focus mainly on the 802.11-based networks in infrastructure 
mode, where they are using open system authentication. It proposes a solution to 
protect WLANs against connection request flooding DoS attacks. Figure 1.2 
demonstrates diagrammatically how this research has been narrowed down to cover 
the existing gap, the arrows show the path. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 A secure system is robust (Stapko, 2010) 
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Figure 1.2   The Narrow-down View of the Research Scope 
 
 
Based on the availability of the software and hardware, this research has been 
narrow down within the following scopes: 
 
 
i. To implement and test the proposed solution, two open source device 
drivers are used, namely RT73_Linux_STA_Drv1.0.4.0 and hostapd-
0.5.8, for wireless cards which use rt73 and prism chipset running on 
Linux operating systems. Other wireless NIC cards can be used as long as 
the device drivers for LINUX can be obtained. 
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ii. The above drivers will be modified using C/C++ programming language 
to add the proposed solution to the wireless association procedure. 
 
iii. The research will not target other DoS attacks on WLANs such as 
jamming attacks. Hence, it is assumed that the test environment is immune 
to other types of DoS attacks. 
 
iv. This research will not support ad hoc wireless networks, but it will be 
recommended as a support for ad hoc wireless networks in future work. 
 
v. This research targets those WLANs that have been deployed in public area 
so that no MAC filtering scheme is in place. 
 
 
 
 
1.9 Outline of the Thesis 
 
 
Chapter 1 introduce the WLAN security challenges and highlighted the 
harmful impact of connection request flooding (CRF) Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
on WLANs. In addition, the countermeasures were introduced and compelling reasons 
that why the current puzzle are not suitable to protect WLAN were provided. 
Ultimately, the chapter presented the objectives that this research is going to achieve. 
Chapter 2 provides a fact-finding mission on WLANs technologies and security 
challenges it has been faced. The client puzzles are studied deeply in three classified 
groups including hash-based puzzles, number theoretic puzzles, and other payment 
schemes ,while the weaknesses and strengthens of each are detailed. Moreover, the 
chapter presents the DNA protein synthesizing process in four steps: Transcription, 
Initiation, Elongation (Translation), and Elongation and Termination. 
 
 
Chapter 3 provides an academic pathway to achieve the research objectives. 
The chapter specifies the security and performance analysis models. Chapter 4 mainly 
focuses on design and implementing the proposed puzzle (OROD puzzle). It also 
displays the results coming from implementing the real-world test-bed of proposed 
puzzle. Chapter 5 analyzes the results deeply and a comprehensive performance 
16 
 
comparison between OROD puzzle and current puzzle is presented. In addition, the 
OROD puzzle is studied from a security perspective where the Chen security model is 
employed. This research comes to end with Chapter 6 where a comprehensive 
conclusion is reached. All achieved objectives and contributions of the research are 
exhibit in this chapter. 
 
 
  
163 
 
 
REFERENCES 
      
 
Abadi, M., Burrows, M., Manasse, M., and Wobber, T. (2005, May). Moderately 
hard, memory-bound functions. ACM Transactions on Internet Technology 
(TOIT), 5(2), 299 - 327. 
Abliz, M., and Znati, T. (2009). A Guided Tour Puzzle for Denial of Service 
Prevention. 2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. IEEE 
Computer Society, 279-288.  
Abraham, A. M., and Vincent, S. (2012). Defending DoS Attacks Using a Puzzle-
Based Approach and Reduction in Traceback Time towards the Attacker . 
Communications in Computer and Information Science, Springer, 269, 425-433. 
Alruban, A., and Everitt, E. (2011). Two Novel 802.1x Denial of Service Attacks. 
IEEE Computer Society, 183-190. 
Anuradha, and Singhrova, A. (2011). A Host Based Intrusion Detection System for 
DDoS Attack in WLAN. International Conference on Computer & 
Communication Technology (ICCCT)-2011. IEEE. 
Arockiam, L., Vani, B., Sivagowry, S., and Persia, A. (2012). A Solution to Prevent 
Resource Flooding Attacks in 802.11 WLAN. Communications in Computer and 
Information Science, Springer, 269(1), 607-616. 
Assoc., P. C. (2006). Test TCP (TTCP) Benchmarking Tool for Measuring TCP and 
UDP Performance. (Printing Communications Assoc.) Retrieved from PCAUSA 
Test Lab (PCATTCP "Classic" - PCAUSA's Port Of TTCP To Windows 
Sockets): http://testlab.pcausa.com/ttcp/classic/pcattcp.htm 
Aura, T., Nikander, P., and Leiwo, J. (2001). DOS-resistant Authentication with 
Client Puzzles. Sringer Lecture Notes in Computer Science: Security Protocols, 
2133/2001, 170-177. 
Back, A. (2002). Hashcash–a denial of service counter-measure. Technical report. 
Retrieved from http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf 
 
164 
 
Beard, C., and Stallings, W. (2015). Wireless Communication Networks and Systems 
(1st ed.). Pearson. 
Bicakci, K., and Tavli, B. (2009, September). Denial-of-Service attacks and 
countermeasures in IEEE 802.11 wireless networks. Computer Standards & 
Interfaces, 31(5), 931–941. 
Boneh, D., and Naor, M. (2000). Timed Commitments. Advances in Cryptology , 
1880(1), 236-254. 
Burleigh, S., G. Cerf, V., Crowcroft, J., and Tsaoussidis, V. (2014). Space for 
Internet and Internet for space. Ad Hoc Networks, Elsevier, 23, 80-86. 
Cai, J.-Y., Lipton, R., Sedgewick, R., and Yao, A. C.-C. (1993). Towards 
uncheatable benchmarks. Structure in Complexity Theory Conference.  
Carl, G., Kesidis, G., Brooks, R. R., and Rai, S. (2006). Denial-of-Service Attack-
Detection Techniques . IEEE Internet Computing, 10(1), 82- 89. 
Chen, L., Morrissey, P., and Smart, N. (2009). Security Notions and Generic 
Constructions for Client Puzzles. ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th 
International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and 
Information Security: Advances in Cryptology, (pp. 505 - 523). 
Chen, Y., Kowalik, K., and Davis, M. (2009). MeshScan: Performance of Passive 
Handoff and Active Handoff. International Conference on Wireless 
Communications & Signal Processing, 2009. WCSP 2009. Nanjing : IEEE, 1-5. 
Chen, Y., Trappe, W., and Martin, R. P. (2007). Detecting and Localizing Wireless 
Spoofing Attacks. 4th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on 
Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, ( SECON '07). San 
Diego, CA : IEEE, 193-202. 
Chibiao, L., Chugui, X., Jinming, Q., and Changjing, L. (2011, December). 
Experimental and Theoretical Study of Authentication Request Flooding Attack 
on 802.11 WLAN. Elsevier, 13, 6800-6808. 
Dahshan, H., and Irvine, J. (2008). Analysis of Key Distribution in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks Based on Message Relaying. IEEE International Conference on 
Wireless & Mobile Computing, Networking & Communication . IEEE Computer 
Society, 538-542. 
D'Ambrosia., J. (2012, Aug). Retrieved from IEEE 802 LAN/MAN Standards 
Committee: http://www.ieee802.org/ 
165 
 
Das, R., and Doshi, S. (2004). Network Security Final Report Memory Bound Client 
Puzzles. Universty Project, John Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland. 
Dong, Q., Gao, L., and Li, X. (2010). A New Client-Puzzle Based DoS-Resistant 
Scheme of IEEE 802.11i Wireless Authentication Protocol. 3rd International 
Conference on Biomedical Engineering and Informatics (BMEI 2010). IEEE, 
2712-2716. 
Dong, Q., Gao, L., and Li, X. (2010). A New Client-Puzzle Based DoS-Resistant 
Scheme of IEEE 802.11i Wireless Authentication Protocol. 3rd International 
Conference on Biomedical Engineering and Informatics (BMEI 2010). IEEE, 
2712-2716. 
Dong, Q., Li, L., and Li, X. (2011, December). Quadratic Residue Based Client 
Puzzle Distributed by Beacon Frame in DoS-Resistant Wireless Access 
Authentication . Advances in Information Sciences and Service Sciences (AISS) , 
3(11), 79-86. 
Doshi, S., Monrose, F., and Rubin, A. D. (2006). Efficient Memory Bound Puzzles 
Using Pattern Databases. Applied Cryptography and Network Security, 3989, 
98–113. 
Dwork, C., and Naor, M. (1992). Pricing via processing or combatting junk mail. 
Springer-Verlag.A, 139-147. 
Dwork, C., Goldberg, A., and Naor, M. (2003). On Memory-Bound Functions for 
Fighting Spam . Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003, 23rd Annual 
International Cryptology Conference. Santa Barbara, California, USA. 426-444. 
Eian, M. (2012). Robustness in Wireless Network Access Protocols. Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology. 
Eian, M., and Mjølsnes, S. F. (2011). The modeling and comparison of wireless 
network denial of service attacks. Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SOSP Workshop 
on Networking, Systems, and Applications on Mobile Handhelds, (pp. 1-6). 
Faria, D. B., and Cheriton, D. R. (2006). Detecting Identity-Based Attacks in 
Wireless Networks Using Signalprints. Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop 
on Wireless Security, 43–52. 
Fayssal, S., and Kim, n. U. (2010). Performance Analysis Toolset for Wireless 
Intrusion Detection Systems. IEEE International Conference on High 
Performance Computing and Simulation (HPCS), 484-490. 
166 
 
Feng, W.-c., Kaiser, E., Feng, W.-c., and Luu, A. (2005). The Design and 
Implementation of Network Puzzles. 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE 
Computer and Communications Societies (INFOCOM 2005). Miami, Florida: 
IEEE,  2372- 2382 vol. 4.  
Ferreri, F., Bernaschi, M., and Valcamonici, L. (2010). Research on the security of 
IEEE 802.1× authentication mechanism in wireless LAN. 2nd International 
Conference on Information Science and Engineering (ICISE). Hangzhou, China: 
IEEE, 2350-2353. 
Fragkiadakis, A., Askoxylakis, I., and Chatziadam, P. (2014). Denial-of-Service 
Attacks in Wireless Networks Using Off-the-Shelf Hardware. Distributed, 
Ambient, and Pervasive Interactions, Springer, 8530(1), 427–438. 
Gao, Y. (2005). Efficient trapdoor-based client puzzle system against DoS attacks. 
Technical Report. 
Gast, M. (2005). 802.11 Wireless Networks The Definitive Guide. O'Reilly. 
Gast, M. (2005). 802.11 Wireless Networks The Definitive Guide. Sebastopol, CA: 
O'Reilly. 
Gherghina, C., and Petrică, G. (2013). Wireless LAN Security Issues (I). Types of 
Attacks. International Journal of Information Security and Cybercrime, 2(2), 
61-68. 
Groza, B., and Warinschi, B. (2013). Cryptographic puzzles and DoS resilience, 
revisited. Design, Codes and Cryptography - Springer. 
Gu, Q., Liu, P., Lee, W.-C., and Chu, C.-H. (2009, JULY/SEPTEMBER). KTR: An 
Efficient Key Management Scheme for Secure Data Access Control in Wireless 
Broadcast Services. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 
6(3), 188-201. 
Hangargi, M. (2015). Denial of Service Attacks in Wireless Networks. Retrieved from 
Paket Storm Security: 
https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/130092/DoS_attacks_in_wireless_ 
networks.pdf 
Hao, W., Qiaoli, W., and Min, W. (2010). Research and implementation of an anti-
replay method based on WIA-PA network. 2nd International Conference on 
Industrial Mechatronics and Automation (ICIMA). Wuhan, China: IEEE, 68-71. 
167 
 
Hlavacs, H., Gansterer, W., Schabauer, H., and Zottl, J. (2008). Enhancing ZRTP by 
using Computational Puzzles. Journal of Universal Computer Science, 14(5), 
693-716. 
Hofheinz, D. U. (2006). Simulatable security and polynomially bounded concurrent 
composability. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. Berkeley/Oakland, 
CA: IEEE, 1081-6011. 
Hwanga, M.-S., Chong, S.-K., and Chen, T.-Y. (2010, January). DoS-resistant ID-
based password authentication scheme using smart cards. Journal of Systems 
and Software, Elsevier, 83(1), 163–172. 
IEEE LAN/MAN Standards Committee. (2007, June 12). IEEE Std 802.11. New 
York, USA: IEEE Computer Society. 
IEEE LAN/MAN Standards Committee. (2012). General description. In Part 11: 
Wireless LAN Medium Access Control , IEEE Std 802.11™-2012. New York, 
USA: IEEE, 44-91. 
IEEE LAN/MAN Standards Committee. (2012). Overview. In Part 11: Wireless 
LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) S pecifications 
(p. 1). NY, USA: IEEE. 
IEEE LAN/MAN Standards Committee. (2012). Security. In Part 11: Wireless LAN 
Medium Access Control , IEEE Std 802.11-2012. NY: IEEE, 1170-1191. 
Jeckmans, A. (2009). Practical client puzzle from repeated squaring. Master Essay, 
University of Twente, Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer 
Science. 
Jerschow, Y. I., and Mauve, M. (2012). Secure Client Puzzles Based on Random 
Beacons. Networking, 7290(1), 184-197. 
Jerschow, Y. I., and Mauve, M. (2013). Modular square root puzzles: Design of non-
parallelizable and non-interactive client puzzles. Elsevier: computers & security, 
35(1), 25-36. 
Jerschow, Y., and Mauve, M. (2011). Non-parallelizable and non-interactive client 
puzzles from modular square roots. Sixth International Conference on 
Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2011.  
Jerschow, Y., Scheuermann, B., and Mauve, M. (2009). Counter-Flooding: DoS 
Protection for Public Key Handshakes in LANs. ICNS '09. Fifth International 
Conference on Networking and Services.  
168 
 
Jing, H., and Wen, W. (2011, March). A Solution to a Dos Attack in Wireless 
Networks. Energy Procedia, Elsevier, 13, 3932–3936. 
Jules, A., and Brainard, J. (1999). Client Puzzle: A Cryptographic Countermeasure 
against Connection Depletion Attacks. Proceedings of the Network and 
Distributed System Security Symposium. San Diego: 151-165. 
Karame, G. O., and Čapkun, S. (2010). Low-Cost Client Puzzles Based on Modular 
Exponentiation. Computer Security - Springer, 6345(1), 679-697. 
Karumanchi, N., A, D. D., and M, D. S. (2014). Elements of Computer Networking: 
An Integrated Approach (1st ed.). CareerMonk Publications. 
Koh, J. Y., Ming, J. T., and Niyato, D. (2013). Rate limiting client puzzle schemes 
for denial-of-service mitigation. Wireless Communications and Networking 
Conference . IEEE. 
Koike, D. (2002, December 4). Client Puzzles as a Defense Against Network Denial 
of Service. ECS, 1-10. 
Kuppusamy, L., Rangasamy, J., Stebila, D., Boyd, C., and González Nieto, J. (2012). 
Practical Client Puzzles in the Standard Model. ACM Computer and 
Communications Security, 42-43. 
Kurose, J. F., and Ross, K. w. (2010). Computer Networking, A Top-Down Approach 
(Fifth Edition ed.). Pearson. 
Laishun, Z., Minglei, Z., and Yuanbo, G. (2010). A Client Puzzle Based Defense 
Mechanism to Resist DoS Attacks in WLAN. 2010 International Forum on 
Information Technology and Applications - IEEE Computer Society, 424-427. 
Lei, Y., Pierre, S., and Quintero, A. (2006). Client Puzzles Based on Quasi Partial 
Collisions Against DoS Attacks in UMTS. Vehicular Technology Conference, 
2006. VTC-2006 Fall. 2006 IEEE 64th, (pp. 1-5). 
Lenstra, K., A., Lenstra Jr., H. W., and Lovász, L. (1982, December ). Factoring 
polynomials with rational coefficients. Mathematische Annalen, 261(4), 515-
534. 
Li, J.-y., and Yang, Y. (2012). Research on DoS Attacks and Resist Method Based 
on 4-way Handshake in 802.11i. In Electrical, Information Engineering and 
Mechatronics. Springer, 631-637. 
Liu, C., and Yu, J. (2008). Rogue Access Point Based DoS Attacks against 802.11 
WLANs. The Fourth Advanced International Conference on 
Telecommunications . IEEE Computer Society, 271-276. 
169 
 
Loukas, G., and Öke, G. (2010). Protection Against Denial of Service Attacks: A 
Survey. The Computer Journal (Oxford journal), 53(7), 1020-1037. 
Malik, M., and Singh, Y. (2015). A Review: DoS and DDoS Attacks. International 
Journal of Computer Science and Mobile Computing, 4(6), 260-265. 
Mao, W. (2001). Timed-Release Cryptography. Selected Areas in Cryptography, 
2259, 342-357. 
Martinovic, I., Zdarsky, F. A., Wilhelm, M., Wegmann, C., and Schmitt, J. B. 
(2008). Wireless Client Puzzles in IEEE 802.11 Networks:Security by Wireless. 
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network 
security, (pp. 36-45). 
Mendyk-Krajewska, T., Mazur, Z., and Mazur, H. (2012). Threats to Wireless 
Technologies and Mobile Devices and Company Network Safety. Internet - 
Technical Developments and Applications, Springer, 118, 209-225. 
Merkle, R. C. (1978). Secure communications over insecure channels. 
Communications of the ACM, 21(4), 294 - 299 . 
Moorthy, M., and Sathiyabama, S. (2012). Effective Authentication Technique for 
Distributed Denial of Service Attacks in Wireless Local Area Networks. Journal 
of Computer Science, 8(6), 828-834. 
Morais, A., and Cavalli, A. (2014). A Distributed and Collaborative Intrusion 
Detection Architecture for Wireless Mesh Networks. Mobile Networks and 
Applications, 19(1), 101-120. 
Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and Henderson, T. (2008). RFC 5201 —
Host Identity Protocol (HIP). Network Working Group. The Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF). Retrieved from 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5201.txt 
Naqvi, A. (2013). Utilising Fuzzy Logic to Improve Wi-Fi Security. 11th 
International Conference on ICT and Knowledge Engineering (ICT&KE). 
Bangkok : IEEE, 1- 5. 
Narasimhan, H., Varadarajan, V., and Rangan, C. P. (2010). Game Theoretic 
Resistance to Denial of Service Attacks Using Hidden Diﬃculty Puzzles. 
ISPEC'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information 
Security Practice and Experience, (pp. 359-376 ). 
Newman, M. (2010). Networks: An Introduction (First ed.). USA: Oxford University 
Press. 
170 
 
Odom, W. (2008). CCENT/CCNA ICND1. Indiana: Cisco Press. 
Orebaugh, A., Ramirez, G., and Burke, J. B. (2006). Wireshark & Ethereal Network 
Protocol Analyzer Toolkit (Fisrt ed.). Elsevior. 
Perahia, E., and Stacey, R. (2013). Next Generation Wireless LANs: 802.11n and 
802.11ac (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. 
Ragupathy, R., and Sharma, R. (2014). Detecting Denial of Service Attacks by 
Analysing Network Traffic in Wireless Networks. International Journal of Grid 
Distribution Computing, 7(3), 103-112. 
Rangasamy, J., Stebila, D., Boyd, C., and Nieto, J. (2011, March). An Integrated 
Approach to Cryptographic Mitigation of Denial-of-Service Attacks. ASIACCS 
'11 Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and 
Communications Security, 114-123. 
Rangasamy, J., Stebila, D., Kuppusamy, L., Boyd, C., and Nieto, J. G. (2012). 
Efficient Modular Exponentiation-Based Puzzles for Denial-of-Service 
Protection. Information Security and Cryptology, Springer, 7259, 319-331. 
Ratnayake, D. N., Kazemian, H. B., and Yusuf, S. A. (2014). Identification of probe 
request attacks in WLANs. Neural Computing & Applications, Springer, 25, 1-
14. 
Rehman, S. U., Ullah, S., and Ali, S. (2010). On Enhancing the WEP Security 
Against Brute-force and Compromised Keys. InternationalConference on 
Computer Information Systems and IndustrialManagement Applications 
(CISIM). IEEE, 250-254. 
Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., and Wagner, D. A. (1996, March 10). Time-lock Puzzles 
and Timed-release Crypto. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Cambridge, 
USA: MIT/LCS/TR-684, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science. 
Rosenthal, D. S. (2003, Nov). On The Cost Distribution of a Memory Bound 
Function. Computing Research Repository (CoRR), 1-7. 
Sandberg, B. (2015). Networking The Complete Reference, Third Edition (3rd ed.). 
McGrow-Hill Education. 
Schaller, P., Čapkun, S., and Basin, D. (2007). BAP: Broadcast Authentication Using 
Cryptographic Puzzles. Applied Cryptography and Network Security, 4521, 401-
419. 
171 
 
Sharma, N., and Barwal, P. N. (2014). Study of DoS Attacks on IEEE 802.11 WLAN 
and its Prevention/Detection Techniques. International Journal of Engineering 
Science and Innovative Technology, 3(3), 245-252. 
Shi, T.-j., and Ma, J.-f. (2006). Design and analysis of a wireless authentication 
protocol against DoS attacks based on Hash function. Aerospace Electronics 
Information Engineering and Control, (pp. 122-126). 
Shoup, V. (2004). Sequence of Games: A Tool for Taming Complexity in Security 
Proofs. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/332. Retrieved from 
http://eprint.iacr.org/.: http://eprint.iacr.org/ 
Singh, R., and Sharma, T. P. (2014). A Key Hiding Communication Scheme for 
Enhancing the Wireless LAN Security. Wireless Personal Communications, 
77(2), 1145-1165. 
Singh, R., and Sharma, T. P. (2015). On the IEEE 802.11i security: a denial-of-
service perspective. Security and Communication Networks, Wiley, 8(7), 1378–
1407. 
Smith, C., and Collins, D. (2014). Wireless Networks (3rd ed.). McGrow-Hill 
Education. 
Smith, C., and Collins, D. (2014). Wireless Networks (3rd ed.). Mc Graw Hill 
Education. 
Soryal, J., and Saadawi, T. (2014). IEEE 802.11 DoS attack detection and mitigation 
utilizing Cross Layer Design. Ad Hoc Networks, Elsevier, 14, 71-83. 
Stapko, T. (2010). EETimes design. Retrieved October 10, 2012, from 
http://www.eetimes.com/design/embedded-internet-design/4019862/Practical-
Embedded-Security--Part-3-Wireless-technologies?pageNumber=1 
Stebila, D., Kuppusamy, L., Rangasamy, J., Boyd, C., and Gonzalez Nieto, J. (2011). 
Stronger Difficulty Notions for Client Puzzles and Denial-of-Service-Resistant 
Protocols. Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2011, springer, 6558, 284-301. 
Tanenbaum, A. S., and J. Wetherall, D. (2010). Computer Network (Fifth Edition 
ed.). Prentice Hall. 
Tang, Q., and Jeckmans, A. (2010). On Non-Parallelizable Deterministic Client 
Puzzle Scheme with Batch Verification Modes. University of Twente, Centre for 
Telematics and Information Technology, Netherland (Enschede). Retrieved from 
http://doc.utwente.nl/69557/ 
172 
 
Tang, Q., and Jeckmans, A. (2010). On Non-Parallelizable Deterministic Client 
Puzzle Scheme with Batch Verification Modes. University of Twente, Centre for 
Telematics and Information Technology, Netherland (Enschede). Retrieved from 
http://doc.utwente.nl/69557/ 
Tang, Q., and Jeckmans, A. (2011). Towards a security model for computational 
puzzle schemes. International Journal of Computer Mathematics, Taylor & 
Francis, 88(11), 2246–2257. 
Thapa, B. (2011). Robust Wireless Communication in Adversarial Settings. PhD 
Thesis, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts. 
Thapa, B. (2012). Robust Wireless Communication in Adversarial Settings. 
Northeastern University. ProQuest. Retrieved from Lyrtech RD: 
http://lyrtechrd.com/en/products/view/+tunable-rf-modules 
Tritilanunt, S., Boyd, C., Foo, E., and Nieto, J. M. (2007). Toward Non-parallelizable 
Client Puzzles. Cryptology and Network Security, 4856, 247-264. 
Tupakul, U., Varadharajan, V., and Vuppala, S. K. (2011). Counteracting DDoS 
Attacks in WLAN. Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security 
of information and networks , (pp. 119-126 ). 
Von Ahn, L., Blum, M., Hopper, N. J., and Langford, J. (2003). CAPTCHA: Using 
Hard AI Problems for Security. Advances in Cryptology, 2656, 294-311. 
Walfish, M., Vutukuru, M., Balakrishnan, H., and Karger, D. (2006). DDoS defense 
by offense. SIGCOMM '06 Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, 
technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications. NY. 
Wan, M., Shang, W., Zhao, J., and Zhang, S. (2014). C2Puzzle: A Novel 
Computational Client Puzzle for Network Security. Advanced Materials 
Research, 846-847, 1615-1619. 
Wang, L., Srinivasan, B., and Bhattacharjee, N. (2011, March). Security Analysis 
and Improvements on WLANs. Journal of Networks, 6(3), 470-481. 
Wang, X., and Reiter, M. K. (2008). A multi-layer framework for puzzle-based 
denial-of-service defense. International Journal of Information Security, 7(4), 
243-263. 
Waters, B., Juels, A., Halderman, J. A., and W. Felten, E. (2004). New client puzzle 
outsourcing techniques for DoS resistance. CCS '04 Proceedings of the 11th 
ACM conference on Computer and communications security , (pp. 246 - 256). 
Washington D.C, USA. 
173 
 
WiFi. (2015). Retrieved 2015, from http://www.wi-fi.org/who-we-are 
Wu, Y., Zhao, Z., Bao, F., and Deng, R. H. (2015). Software Puzzle: A 
Countermeasure to Resource-Inflated Denial-of-Service Attacks. IEEE 
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 10(1), 168-177. 
Ying, X., and Yu, C. (2010). Research on Key Authentication Mechanisms of 
Wireless Local Area Network. 2nd International Workshop on Intelligent 
Systems and Applications (ISA). Wuhan: IEEE, 1 - 4. 
Zeynep Gurkas, G., Zaim, A. H., and Aydin, M. A. (2006). Security Mechanisms 
And Their Performance Impacts On Wireless Local Area Networks. 
International Symposium on Computer Networks (pp. 1 - 5). Istanbul: IEEE. 
Zhang, Y., and Sampalli, S. (2010). Client-based Intrusion Prevention System for 
802.11 Wireless LANs. EEE 6th Intemational Conference on Wireless and 
Mobile Computing. Networking and Communications. IEEE, 100-107. 
Zhao, Y., Vemuri, S., Chen, J., Chen, Y., Zhou, H., and Fu, Z. (. (2009). Exception 
Triggered DoS Attacks on Wireless Networks. IEEE/IFIP International 
Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks, 2009. DSN '09. Lisbon: IEEE, 
13 - 22. 
 
 
 
 
